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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over this Appeal arises 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This appeal presents two issues for review: 
1. Did the trial court err in determining that Plaintiffs offer 
no genuine issue as to any material fact? 
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review on 
summary judgment rulings requires the appellate court to adopt the 
non-movant's facts. Bishop v. Wood. 426 U.S. 341, 347 (1976). In 
other words, the court must give the party opposing the motion 
'"the benefit of all inferences which might reasonably be drawn 
from the evidence.'" Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 
1039 (Utah 1991) quoting Pavne ex rel. Pavne v. Mvers. 743 P.2d 186, 
187-88 (Utah 1987). 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that reasonable minds could 
not differ as to the conclusion that Defendant Swenson acted outside 
the scope of her employment, and thus in granting summary 
judgment? 
Standard of Review: The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
when reasonable minds differ as to whether the employee was 
within the scope of employment, the issue must be submitted to a 
jury. Clover. 808 P.2d at 1040. Hence, summary judgment should 
not be granted unless '"it is clear from the undisputed facts that 
the opposing party cannot prevail.'" Alford v. Utah League of Cities 
& Towns. 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah App. 1990), quoting Lach v. 
Deseret Bank. 746 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Moreover, as to the trial court conclusions of law regarding 
the scope of employment, the appellate court accords the trial 
court's conclusions "no deference, but reviews them for 
correctness." Clover. 808 P.2d at 1040. See also. Blue Cross & Blue 
1 
Shield v. State of Utah. 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989); Bonham v. 
Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) M991). 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day 
of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, 
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jeff Christensen and Kyle James Fausett filed this suit in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County. The cause of action 
seeks damages from Defendants for injuries caused by negligence. 
Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett claim that Defendant Gloria Swenson 
negligently failed to stop or yield at a posted stop sign which 
resulted in a collision between her automobile and the motorcycle 
they were riding. In the ensuing accident, Mr. Christensen and Mr. 
Fausett were both seriously injured. Because they allege that the 
collision occurred while Ms. Swenson acted within the scope of her 
employment, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett sued Ms. Swenson and 
her employer, Burns Security Systems, Inc., ("Burns"). Defendant 
Swenson has since filed for bankruptcy and has been fully 
discharged. 
In response to Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's suit, Defendant 
Burns filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Motion argued that 
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Ms. Swenson did not act within the course and scope of her 
employment at the time of the accident and therefore her employer, 
Burns, could not be held liable. (R. 102) Mr. Christensen and Mr. 
Fausett opposed the Motion and on November 1, 1991, Judge Cullen Y. 
Christensen heard oral argument from both sides. (R. 204) On 
November 5, 1991, Judge Christensen issued an Order granting 
Defendant Bum's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 206) It is from 
this Order which Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts in this case concern liability for injuries which Mr. 
Christensen and Mr. Fausett suffered when Defendant Gloria Swenson 
struck their motorcycle. At the time the collision occurred, Ms. 
Swenson worked for Defendant Burns and was on duty as a security 
guard at the northeast entrance of Geneva Steel. (R. 131) 
Because the accident happened when Ms. Swenson rushed 
across the street to pick up a cup of soup on break, the company's 
practice concerning breaks become material to this appeal. At all 
times pertinent to the case, Defendant Burns expected its employees 
to work as much as possible throughout their entire shift and to take 
personal comfort breaks, including lunch, with as little interruption 
to their duties as possible. (R. 144) In fact, no regularly scheduled 
breaks existed. In addition Burns paid employees during time taken 
for latrine breaks, coffee breaks, and lunch breaks. (R. 144) 
Since Burns employees understood the need to remain on the 
job as much as possible they either brought their lunch or ordered 
lunch from one of two nearby cafes. Often one employee would 
check with others to see if they wanted lunch from the cafes and 
then pick up lunch for all those that ordered. (R. 142-139). At the 
northeast station, Gate Four, where Ms. Swenson worked, employees 
placed a menu near the telephone for the Frontier Cafe, located 
across the street. (R. 139-138) 
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Not only did Burns management know about the employee 
practice of using the cafes for lunch pick ups, but the district 
manager testified that he too had picked up and distributed lunches 
for employees. (R. 142) Ms. Swenson testified that her lieutenant 
told her to check with the other employees to see if they also 
wanted to order food before she went to pick up her lunch. (R. 139) 
Frequently she brought food back to her own lieutenants. (R. 139) 
Furthermore, on occasion the management held company meetings at 
the cafes. (R. 141; 138). 
On July 26, 1989, Ms. Swenson observed a pause in the Geneva 
Steel traffic and decided to telephone the Frontier Cafe for lunch. 
According to standard employee practice, she asked her co-worker if 
he wanted to order some food; he did not. After telephoning her 
order for a cup of soup, Ms. Swenson began to walk across the street 
to the cafe and then elected to drive her car because, as her co-
worker testified, she believed it would better serve Defendant Burns 
by returning her to work more quickly. On the way back to work Ms. 
Swenson failed to yield at a posted stop sign and, as a result entered 
Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's lane of traffic. Mr. Christensen and 
Mr. Fausett collided with the Swenson automobile when Mr. Fausett 
could not stop or avoid the accident. Both Mr. Christensen and Mr. 
Fausett received serious injuries. (R. 131-128). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant Burns failed to 
meet the standard required by Utah Civil Rule of Procedure, Rule 
56(c). Not only did it furnish facts vigorously disputed by Plaintiffs 
Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett, it also neglected to provide enough 
material facts to support the motion. In contrast, Mr. Christensen 
and Mr. Fausett furnished numerous facts focused on Defendant 
Burns' employment policies and practices, central to the issue in 
this motion. Rather than address most of these facts, Defendant 
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simply and erroneously dismissed them as irrelevant. 
Besides failing to provide the court with undisputed and 
enough material facts, Defendant Burns also failed to establish that 
it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under Mr. Christensen 
and Mr. Fausett's version of the facts, the evidence supports 
reasonable minds concluding that at the time of the accident Ms. 
Swenson acted within the scope of her employment. 
Factors which fit neatly within the criteria listed in Birkner v. 
Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1953, 1056-57 (Utah 1989) include 
testimony that Ms. Swenson followed employee practice in using the 
cafe, in checking with her fellow guard, and in selecting the cafe for 
its proximity. Bums' management knew about employee use of the 
cafe for breaks and food, and also used it themselves; Ms. Swenson's 
conduct was not unexpected. Not only did she remain on duty 
without logging out or in, as required by company policy, Defendant 
Burns also paid Ms. Swenson for the time she took on the break. Her 
short deviation to go across the street and pick up a cup of soup 
would have taken no more than 5-10 minutes, much like a latrine 
break. Ms. Swenson's actions were, therefore, incidental to her 
employment, and not wholly a personal endeavor. Carter v. Bessev. 
97 Utah 427, 93 P.2d 490, 492 (Utah 1939) ("A slight deviation from 
order or attending incidentally to other business than the master's, 
but which does not dissever the servant from the master's business 
does not relieve the master from liability for the servant's 
negligence.") 
Second, a jury reasonably could conclude that the cafe is 
substantially within the ordinary spatial boundaries of Ms. 
Swenson's employment because of its close proximity to her station. 
Testimony depicted the cafe as no farther than the closest latrine 
facility on Geneva property. Furthermore, Burns use of the Frontier 
Cafe for meetings, breaks, and as a place to order and take out food 
serves to bring it substantially within the spatial boundaries of 
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employment. 
Finally, the manner in which Ms. Swenson took her break, 
waiting for a lull in traffic, using a car so that she might return to 
work more quickly, and resorting to the closest possible facility, all 
indicate that the context of her conduct focused primarily on serving 
her employer's interest. Like the facts in Clover v. Snowbird Ski 
Resort. 808 P. 2d 1037 (Utah 1991), the evidence in this case is 
sufficient for a jury to conclude that at the time of the accident, Ms. 
Swenson acted within the scope of her employment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE 
THE COURT FROM GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
On November 5, 1991, the trial court granted Defendant Bums' 
Motion for Summary Judgment stating: "In the view of the Court 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that said Def is 
entitled to Judgment as a matter of law." See Exhibit 1, Ruling, Nov. 
5, 1991 at 1(a). Hence, the first concern in this appeal is whether 
genuine issues of material fact do exist which would prevent a 
summary judgment ruling. Plaintiffs, Mr. Christensen and Mr. 
Fausett, assert that they have adequately demonstrated the material 
facts to be in dispute and that on this basis, the trial court's ruling 
should be overturned. 
The language of the court's order granting summary judgment 
clearly reflects the standard provided in Rule 56, Summary 
Judgments. This Rule states in part (c): 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions. 
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answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file-
together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). In other words, according to 
the highlighted portion quoted above, the Defendant must first 
establish that 1) no dispute exists, 2) concerning facts that are 
material to the cause of action. 
In attempting to carry this burden, Defendant provided the 
court with a list of six allegedly undisputed facts. Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support at 1-3. All of these statements, with the 
exception of Fact #4, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett dispute as 
misleading or incomplete. In other words, Defendant has not only 
failed to furnish enough material facts, it has also failed to 
establish that those provided are undisputed. 
Thus for example, in its Fact #6 Defendant asserted that "the 
guards could take a short break in the area of their appointed post. 
Lunch was expected to be taken on the job." By way of response, Mr. 
Christensen and Mr. Fausett offered depositions from both 
management and employees establishing that the guards were not so 
limited. Kim Hancey, Burns' Client Supervisor, stated that because 
the restroom facilities for the gate were in the next office building, 
the guards did not have to take their breaks at the specific island or 
at the gate post.1 Furthermore Kenneth H. Mayne, the highest 
member of management for Burns in the region, testified that Burns 
had no written procedures nor oral policies concerning either latrine 
or lunch breaks.2 Oreon G. Olsen, a fellow guard with Ms. Swenson, 
1 See Exhibit 2, Hancey Deposition at page 33, lines 10-18 
2 See Exhibit 3, Mayne Deposition at page 38, line 17 through page 39, line 24. 
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noted that he had never been told that he could not go to the Frontier 
Cafe and get lunch.3 And, Ms. Swenson emphasized that "we had no 
policy that you could not leave or anything else. And we just went 
across the highway to get our lunches a lot of the time."4 Moreover, 
as Ms. Swenson pointed out, not only did the management know that 
the guards left their posts for breaks and lunch, the lieutenants also 
used the cafes to get their own lunch and to pick up lunches for 
others.5 
In statement #5, Defendant declared that the Frontier Cafe is 
located outside Geneva Steel boundaries where Ms. Swenson worked. 
While Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett acknowledge that the Cafe 
does not lie within the geographical boundaries of the Geneva Plant, 
nonetheless they provided ample evidence of its use and role in 
Burns' activity. Mr. Mayne, Burns' District Manager, admitted that 
the management occasionally held meetings at cafes outside Geneva 
and that he personally had picked up lunches from Frontier.6 Captain 
Mike Transtrum, supervisor of all security officers, reported that 
these meetings occurred "once or twice a month."7 In addition, Mr. 
Transtrum observed that Burns' guards used the cafes for various 
breaks including latrine and lunch breaks.8 Specifically, guards 
stationed at Ms. Swenson's post either walked or drove across the 
street to the Frontier Cafe to pick up food.9 Mr. Olsen, a fellow 
3 See Exhibit 4, Olsen Deposition at page 29, lines 8-13. 
4 See Exhibit 5, Swenson Deposition at page 18, lines 2-4. 
5 See Exhibit 5, Swenson Deposition at page 43, lines 9-16, and page 56, lines 12-18. 
6 See Exhibit 3, Mayne Deposition at page 43, lines 20-25, and at page 41, lines 5-18. 
7 See Exhibit 6, Transtrum Deposition at page 36, lines 5-19. 
8 See Exhibit 6, Transtrum Deposition at page 43, lines 11-21; page 16, line 6 through page 
17, line 10; and page 28, lines 10-22. 
9 See Exhibit 7, Bezzant Deposition at page 12, lines 16-19 and page 16, lines 17-22. 
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guard stationed with Ms. Swenson, stated that although he had not 
used the Frontier Cafe during a working shift, he knew that other 
guards did.10 
As with Fact #5, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett assert that 
while the remainder of Defendant's facts may provide some 
information, by and large the information is inaccurate because if 
fails to give the context and the events surrounding Defendant Burns 
employment policies and procedures. Accordingly, Defendant's 
statement of facts fails to establish its case and bars it from 
obtaining a motion for summary judgment. See Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition at 8-26, wherein Mr. Christensen and Mr. 
Fausett furnish the trial court with a statement of 40 additional 
facts, many of which contradict the version Defendant provides. 
Rather than admit or dispute Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's 
list of facts, Defendant primarily dismisses them as irrelevant. 
Reply Memorandum at 5-8. This argument leads to the second part of 
Defendant's burden, that no dispute exists over material facts. In 
other words, Defendant seems to argue that the facts upon which Mr. 
Christensen and Mr. Fausett rely to dispute those provided in its 
motion, are immaterial. Hence, in its reply to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, Defendant Burns contended that the court must limit 
its examination to what happened on the day of the accident. Reply 
Memorandum at 2. Specifically, Defendant insisted that the court 
could not consider the employees' lunchtime practices and their use 
of the Frontier cafe. Nor could the court review Defendant 
Swenson's prior acts and the instructions she received from 
management concerning lunch breaks. Jd. 
Since the critical issue in this case is whether or not 
Defendant Swenson injured Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett while in 
the scope of her employment, thereby creating liability in Defendant 
10 See Exhibit 4, Olsen Deposition at page 26, line 16 through page 28, line 21. 
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Burns, Plaintiffs assert that the court must consider employment 
policies and practices. These facts not only provide an important 
framework, but they also literally define the duties and sweep of 
employment and thus are material. 
Black's Law Dictionary states that in the context of summary 
judgment: 
A fact is "material" and precludes grant of 
summary judgment if proof of that fact would have 
effect of establishing or refuting one of essential 
elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the 
parties, and would necessarily affect application of 
appropriate principle of law to the rights and obligation 
of the parties. 
Black's Law Dictionary 977 (6th ed. 1990) citing Johnson v. Soulis. 
542 P.2d 867, 872 (Wyo. 1975). In this case, Defendant Burns claims 
as its defense that Ms. Swenson acted outside the scope of her 
employment. Therefore, according to the dictionary definition, any 
fact that would refute Defendant's claim and would instead 
establish that Ms. Swenson was within the scope of employment 
when she injured Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett would necessarily 
be material. 
Although Utah law has not yet directly addressed what facts in 
a scope of employment case are material, the Utah Supreme Court 
provides some indication in Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 
1037 (Utah 1991). Like this case, Clover concerned a summary 
judgment ruling holding that an employee had not acted within his 
scope of employment when injuring a guest in a skiing accident. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, citing 
the following facts. Snowbird Ski Resort hired the Chris Zulliger as 
a chef in its restaurant at the base of the mountain. In addition, Mr. 
Zulliger sometimes checked on the restaurant midway up the 
mountain. Prior to the accident he had made several inspection trips 
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to the latter restaurant, with Snowbird occasionally paying for 
these additional trips. Clover. 808 P.2d at 1038. 
On the day of the accident, Mr. Zulliger decided to go skiing 
before work. The restaurants' manager asked him to check the 
location part way up the mountain. Although he had not begun work, 
Mr. Zulliger obliged and stopped at the restaurant in the middle of 
his first run down the slope. After leaving the restaurant, he skied 
an additional four runs. On his final run, and on the way to work at 
the lower restaurant, Mr. Zulliger skied off a crest and collided with 
the plaintiff. The Court also noted that the Snowbird Ski patrol had 
warned people not to ski off of the crest and that a posted sign 
instructed skiers to ski slowly in that area. Mr. Zulliger had ignored 
the sign and skied over the crest at a high rate of speed. Jd- at 1039. 
The plaintiff sued Mr. Zulliger and, on a theory of respondeat 
superior, the ski resort. Upon the ski resort's motion for summary 
judgment the trial court, as in this case, ruled that no genuine 
issues of material fact existed and that as a matter of law Mr. 
Zulliger was not acting within the scope of his employment at the 
time of the accident. Jd. at 1039. 
In providing the above facts, the Utah Supreme Court must have 
believed them to be material to its decision. If, however, the Court 
had adopted Defendant's argument in this case -- that a court is 
limited to the events which occurred on the day of the accident --
the facts certainly would have read differently. Indeed, under 
Defendant's approach the statement would more likely match the one 
provided in this case and simply read: 
1. Snowbird hired Mr. Zulliger as a chef in its 
restaurant at the base of the mountain. 
2. On the day of the accident, Mr. Zulliger checked 
the restaurant midway up the mountain and then left to 
ski. 
3. That day Mr. Zulliger did not perform any other 
duty for Snowbird prior to the accident. 
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4. He skied four runs and on the last one, as he was 
returning to work, Mr. Zulliger was involved in an 
accident. 
5. The ski runs do not occupy a part of either 
restaurant where Mr. Zulliger worked. 
6. The resort had a sign posted to ski slowly in the 
area where the accident occurred. 
Nothing in this truncated statement provides the background and 
context which would aid a court in determining the extent an 
employee may leave his or her assigned work and still be within the 
scope of his or her employment. 
In this case the very facts which Defendant Burns passes off 
as "irrelevant" serve to inform the court what employee practices 
and procedures circumscribe the scope of employment. Defendant 
fails both to address Plaintiffs' statement of facts and to provide 
enough material facts to support its motion. Moreover, Mr. 
Christensen and Mr. Fausett adequately dispute Defendant's 
statement of facts as inaccurate or incomplete. Therefore, the trial 
court's grant of Summary Judgment must be overturned. B & A 
Assoc, v. LA. Young Sons Construction. 796 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 
1990) ("Where there is a material issue of fact, however, summary 
judgment is inappropriate."); Atlas Corp v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 
P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987) ("If ... we conclude that there is a dispute 
as to a genuine issue of material fact, we must reverse the grant of 
summary judgment and remand for trial on that issue."). 
POINT 2: BECAUSE REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER AS 
TO WHETHER DEFENDANT SWENSON ACTED WITHIN THE 
SCOPE OR HER EMPLOYMENT, THIS ISSUE MUST BE 
SUBMITTED TO A JURY 
The second part of Rule 56, Summary Judgment, requires the 
movant, after establishing that no dispute exists as to material 
facts, to prove that "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
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matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Again, Defendant fails to meet 
the standard set out in the rule. 
To find that Defendant is entitled to win as a matter of law, 
the Court must first measure the applicable law using Mr. 
Christensen and Mr. Fausett's statement of the facts. See Bishop v. 
Wood. 426 U.S. 341, 347 (1976) ("Since the District Court granted 
summary judgment against the petitioner, the Court must accept his 
version of the facts."); United States v. Diebold. 369 U.S. 654, 655 
(1962) ("In our appraisal of petitioner's claim we must accept his 
version of the facts since the District Court granted summary 
judgment against him."); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 
1037, 1039 (Utah 1991)("[W]hen reviewing an order granting 
summary judgment, the facts are to be liberally construed 'in favor 
of the parties opposing the motion, and those parties are to be given 
the benefit of all inferences which might reasonably be drawn from 
the evidence.'") quoting Pavne ex rel Payne v. Mvers. 743 P.2d 186, 
187-88 (Utah 1987). 
Second, after applying Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's 
version of the facts to the law, the Court must deny, or overrule the 
grant of summary judgment unless there is "no reasonable 
probability that the party moved against could prevail." Frisbee v. K 
& K Construction Co.. 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). £fifi.al££L, 
Alford v. Utah League of Cities & Towns , 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah 
App. 1990)(Summary judgment should not be granted, unless "'it is 
clear from the undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot 
prevail."') quoting Lach v. Deseret Bank. 746 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
This strict caveat particularly applies in a case such as this 
where, as Defendant admits, the "question of whether an employee 
is acting within the scope of employment is a question of fact." 
Clover Y, Snowbird Shi Resort, 808 p.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991); 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support at 3. Hence, the law in this case 
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requires that the issue "must be submitted to a jury 'whenever 
reasonable minds may differ as to whether the [employee] was at a 
certain time involved wholly or partly in the performance of his 
[employer's] business or within the scope of employment.'" Clover. 
808 P.2d at 1040, quoting Carter v. Bessev. 97 Utah 427, 93 P.2d 
490, 493 (1939). 
Against the backdrop of Plaintiffs' facts and the exacting legal 
standard cited in the preceding paragraphs, Defendant fails to meet 
any of the three criteria which would entitle it to judgment as a 
matter of law. These three criteria, described in Birkner v. Salt 
Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989), and refined in Clover v. 
Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991), demonstrate, as a 
matter of law, that reasonable minds could find that Gloria Swenson 
acted within the scope of her employment when she injured Mr. 
Christensen and Mr. Fausett. 
A. Gloria Swenson's Conduct Was Reasonably Incidental to Her 
Employment Duties and Therefore Was Not Wholly a Personal 
Endeavor. 
In determining whether an employee acts within his or her 
scope of employment, the court examines the nature of the conduct. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, puts it this 
way: 
[A]n employee's conduct must be of the general kind the 
employee is employed to perform .... That means that an 
employee's acts or conduct must be generally directed 
toward the accomplishment of objectives within the 
scope of the employee's duties and authority, o r 
reasonably incidental thereto. In other words the 
employee must be about the employer's business and the 
duties assigned bv the employer as opposed to being 
wholly involved in a personal endeavor. 
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771 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989)(emphasis added). The Court's 
formulation does not mean that a decision as to whether an 
employee acts within his or her scope of employment can be simply 
and readily determined. In discussing acts of a personal nature, the 
Comment to the Restatement on Agency observes: 
Although the servant is authorized to act, the master is 
not liable for his conduct unless the servant is in fact 
acting in the employment and for his master's purposes. 
Getting ready to work or clearing away after work may 
be within the scope of employment. So. even such 
personal matters as eating and cleaning of the person 
mav be so much a part of the work and under such control 
that is part of the employment. This is true if the 
master assumes control over the general conduct of the 
servant during such period. If, however, such acts are 
for the personal convenience of the employees and are 
merely permitted by the master in order to make the 
employment more desirable, the acts are not within the 
scope of employment. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229, Comment (c) 
(1958)(emphasis added). 
Moreover, personal behavior "incidental to the conduct 
authorized" could create liability in the employer. M- at § 229(1). 
And, other factors may bring the action within the scope of 
employment. Some of these factors, listed in the Restatement of 
Agency and quoted in Birkner. include questions such as the 
following: Is the act similar to what is authorized; is it one 
commonly done by other employees of the same type; and does the 
employer have reason to expect that the conduct will take place. 
Birkner 771 P.2d at 1056; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229(2) 
(1958). 
In Birkner. the Court applied these various questions and 
factors to hold that the employee acted outside his scope of 
employment. There, the employee worked for Salt Lake County as a 
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therapist at the county mental health facility. After the employee 
became sexually involved with a patient, the patient sued both the 
employee and the county. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the county; 
respondeat superior did not apply. 
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court noted that although 
the offending conduct took place during, or in connection with, 
therapy sessions, "it was not the general kind of activity a therapist 
is hired to perform." 771 P.2d 1058. Nor could it be said that the 
sexual activity was incidental to authorized activity. The 
employee's acts were not similar to what therapists are authorized 
to perform; they are not commonly done by other therapists; and the 
employer generally does not expect that the conduct will take place. 
In fact, written policy forbids sexual contact between social 
workers and patients. Id-
In contrast, the Court in Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort held 
that the employee's acts did fall within in the scope of employment. 
As discussed in Section I, Mr. Zulliger duties consisted of work as a 
chef in one restaurant, and occasionally monitoring the work in 
another restaurant. On the day of the accident, before beginning 
work and yet after checking the second restaurant, Mr. Zulliger skied 
several runs. On his last time down the slope, he collided with and 
injured the plaintiff. 808 P.2d 1037, 1038-39 (Utah 1991). 
The Court ruled that reasonable minds might differ as to 
whether Mr. Zulliger acted within his employment. It stated that 
because Snowbird expected its employees to know how to ski and to 
use the ski lifts and runs, Mr. Zulliger's actions "could be considered 
'to be of the general kind that the employee is employed to 
perform.'" !£. at 1041, quoting Birkner. 771 P.2d at 1057. Even 
though Mr. Zulliger did not return immediately to his job after 
inspecting the restaurant, the Court decided that the factual 
elements present required a jury determination of whether he acted 
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within the scope of his employment when he injured the plaintiff. 
Likewise, in this case, Ms. Swenson performed duties of the 
general kind that Burns hired its employees to perform. Just as Mr. 
Zulliger worked as a chef, Ms. Swenson worked as a security guard at 
Gate Four. Mr. Zulliger was instructed to sometimes check on the 
second restaurant. Similarly, according to practice among the 
security guards at Gate Four and the Island Gate, Ms. Swenson 
checked with other employees to see if they wanted food from the 
Frontier restaurant when she ordered food there for herself.1"! Both 
Mr. Zulliger and Ms. Swenson conducted this activity while on breaks 
or, in the case of Mr. Zulliger, on his own time. And, both employees 
were paid for the time they spent. 12 And, although it might be 
argued that Burns did not hire Ms. Swenson specifically to pick up 
and deliver food,"! 3 neither did Snowbird hire Mr. Zulliger to ski. 
On the day of the accident, the Court found it important that 
Mr. Zulliger had been following instructions to inspect the second 
restaurant; the accident occurred after he had done his job and was 
returning to work. Similarly, on the day that Ms. Swenson collided 
with Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett, she specifically asked fellow 
security guard, Oreon Olsen if he would like her to bring back food 
for him.14 it was on her way back to her station that the accident 
happened. Significantly, after Mr. Zulliger finished his assignment 
to check the restaurant he took time to make at least four ski runs 
11 See Exhibit 5, Swenson Deposition at page 55, lines 1 -5. Later, after the accident Ms. 
Swenson's supervisor specifically instructed her to check on the security guards. Swenson 
Deposition at page 57, line 11 through page 58, line 16. 
12 Concerning paid break time for Burns' employees, see Exhibit 6, Transtrum Deposition at 
page 69, lines 8-22; Exhibit 5, Swenson Deposition at page 53, lines 1-19. 
13 See Love v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.. 760 P.2d 1085 (Ariz. App. 1988) (waitress 
who, immediately following her shift, drove to assistant manager's house at request of band 
member to pick up microphone part was acting within the scope of her employment.); 
14 See Exhibit 5, Swenson Deposition at page 17, lines 14-25; page 74, lines 3-6. 
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before deciding to report in for work. By contrast, Ms. Swenson 
phoned in the order for food, immediately left to pick it up and, 
without any other deviation returned to work. The entire trip would 
have taken 5-10 minutes,15 no more than a latrine break. See Carter 
v. Bessev. 97 Utah 427, 93 P.2d 490, 492 (Utah 1939) ("A slight 
deviation from order or attending incidentally to other business than 
the master's, but which does not dissever the servant from the 
master's business does not relieve the master from liability for the 
servant's negligence.") 
Ms. Swenson's actions in ordering food for fellow guards, in 
going across the street to the Frontier Cafe to pick up lunch, and in 
returning with the lunches mirrored the actions of other Burns' 
employees, including management employees. 16 Clearly, because 
she followed employee practice in performing these activities, her 
conduct was not unexpected. Moreover, she acted somewhat under 
Burns' control, limiting her break to the shortest time possiblel 7 
and hence even the personal act of eating could be said to be either 
within the scope of her employment or reasonably incident to its 
purposes. Carter v. Bessev. 97 Utah 427, 93 P.2d 490, 492 (Utah 
1939) ("One does not cease to be acting within the course of the 
master's employment because his most direct and immediate pursuit 
of the master's business is subject to necessary, usual or incidental 
personal acts ...").1 8 
15 See Exhibit 4, Olsen Deposition at page 35, lines 20-24; Exhibit 2, Hancey Deposition at 
page 30, line 11 through page 33, line 11. 
16 See Exhibit 3, Mayne Deposition at page 41, lines 5-18; Exhibit 5, Swenson Deposition at 
page 56, lines 11-23 and page 43 at lines 9-16; Exhibit 4, Olsen Deposition at page 26, lines 
16 through page 27, line 11 and page 33, lines 4-9. 
17 See Exhibit 4, Olsen Deposition at page 30 at lines 14-16. 
18 Although not directly applicable to this case, an analogy may be found in Workers' 
Compensation cases. Sfi f lg^, King Waterproofing Co. v. Slovskv. 71 Md. App. 247, 524 A.2d 
1245 (N.J. 1987) (Employee within scope of employment while on paid break, crossed the 
street to enter restaurant which was customarily used by employer and employees); Cooper v. 
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B. Gloria Swenson's Actions Occurred Substantially within the 
Hours and Ordinary Spatial Boundaries of Her Employment. 
Besides the nature of the employee's conduct, the court also 
looks to the locale and time of the employee's actions. In Birkner v. 
Salt Lake County, the Utah Supreme Court held that in order for an 
employee's conduct to be considered within the scope of 
employment, he or she must be inside the hours and ordinary spatial 
boundaries of the employment. 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989). 
The Court modified this criterion in Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 
by adding that the employee need only be substantially^^ within the 
hours and ordinary spatial boundaries. 808 P.2d 1037,1040 (Utah 
1991). 
Without question, the accident injuring Mr. Christensen and Mr. 
Swenson occurred wholly within Ms. Swenson's working hours. 
Burns' management repeatedly describes workers as logging into 
work upon arrival and logging out when going off duty at the end of 
Stephens. 470 So. 2d 852 (Fla. App.), petition for rev denied. 480 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1985) 
(Employee within scope of employment when killed a few feet from the plant as he was leaving 
to get coffee at a nearby cafe. Employee was on time clock and he had never been instructed 
not to leave on breaks.); Toohev v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd.. 32 Cal. App. 3d 98, 107 Cal. 
Rptr 773 (1973) (Employee within the scope of employment when using seven minute break to 
leave employer's premises and retrieve his lunch from car parked directly across the street.); 
Jordan v. Western Elec. Co.. 1 Or. App. 441, 463 P.2d 598 (1969) (Employee within scope of 
employment when returning from coffee break. Although employer provided canteen facilities 
on premises, employees customarily went to the nearest restaurant, often accompanied by 
supervisor, and were paid for break). 
19 Plaintiffs Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett respectfully submit that the trial court erred by 
using the wrong standard to determine whether or not Ms. Swenson acted within the scope of 
her employment. In issuing its order, the trial court ruled that Ms. Swenson's conduct "was not 
as a matter of law within the ordinary spatial boundaries of her employment ...." See Exhibit 1 
Ruling, 1(c), November 5, 1991 (emphasis added). Clearly, by omitting the word 
"substantially," the court reads the test too narrowly. Moreover, eliminating "substantially" 
from the standard carefully set out by the Court in Clover v Snowbird Ski Resort, simply 
submits Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett to the wrong analysis. 
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the shift.20 No one logs in and out for lunch or other breaks.2 1 
Moreover, while its employees take their breaks, Burns continues to 
pay them during that time.22 
The issue under this test then, focuses on whether the 
accident occurred substantially within the ordinary spatial 
boundaries of Ms. Swenson's employment. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991), 
illustrates how an employee may not be technically within the 
boundaries or hours of employment and yet still fall within the 
parameters of this criterion. 
The facts of Clover, discussed above, describe the employee, 
Mr. Zulliger, as arriving at work early because he intended to ski 
four or five runs before beginning his shift in the lower restaurant. 
The manager of both of Snowbird's restaurants asked Mr. Zulliger to 
check on the one midway up the mountain. Accordingly, on his first 
time down the slope he stopped and spent approximately twenty 
minutes inspecting the kitchen, talking to personnel, and having a 
snack. Mr. Zulliger then continued skiing on his own time. During his 
last run on an intermediate slope he collided with and injured the 
plaintiff. 808 P.2d 1038-39. 
In this situation, the Court concludes that "there would be 
evidence that Zulliger's actions occurred with the hours and normal 
spatial boundaries of his work." id., at 1041. Clearly, Mr. Zulliger 
had not begun his work at the restaurant nor was he exactly within 
the spatial boundaries of his employment -- the restaurant. The 
20 See Exhibit 3, Mayne Deposition at page 35, line 20 through page 36, line 16; Exhibit 2, 
Hancey Deposition at page 9, line 9 through page 20, line 22; Exhibit 6, Transtrum Deposition 
at page 64, line 11 through page 65, line 7. 
21 See Exhibit 3, Mayne Deposition at page 36, line 17 through page 38, line 12; Exhibit 6, 
Transtrum's Deposition at page 69, lines 8-22. 
22 S_ge_ Exhibit 6, Transtrum's Deposition at page 69, lines 8-22; Exhibit 5, Swenson's 
Deposition at page 53, lines 1-19. 
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Court shuns these technical arguments, and points out that Mr. 
Zulliger was substantially within the test. That is, he was on 
property owned by his employer and at times he had been asked to 
monitor the other restaurant when not working, id., at 1042-43. The 
Court does not seem too concerned with the obvious, more particular 
argument: that Mr. Zulliger had completed the assigned task and was 
skiing on his own time, in a location apart from either restaurant. 
Apparently, as Clover illustrates, in determining whether the 
employee's conduct occurred substantially within the hours and 
ordinary spatial boundaries, the court looks to the general aspects 
rather than the precise details. 
Like the context in Clover, reasonable minds could decide that 
Ms. Swenson's accident occurred substantially within the spatial 
boundaries of her employment. Her journey to the Frontier Cafe 
involved merely crossing the street. In fact, the restroom facilities 
at the cafe are about the same distance away from Island Gate Four 
as the restroom facilities farther into Geneva at the Lower Gate 
Four.23 Consequently some guards considered the cafe more 
convenient for breaks; that is, it allowed a guard to be close in 
proximity to Gate Four, leave that post for the shortest possible 
time, and be back at the gate as soon as possible.24 
Both Burns employees and management repeatedly used the 
cafe for breaks, meetings, and as a place to pick up food and then 
distribute it to fellow workers.25 Prior to the accident, not only 
23 See Exhibit 7, Bezzant Deposition at page 10, lines 1-11 
24 See Exhibit 7, Bezzant Deposition at page 24, line 7-12. 
25 See e.g.. concerning breaks: Exhibit 6, Transtrum's Deposition at page 43, lines 11-21. 
Concerning meetings: Exhibit 2, Hancey Deposition at page 40, lines 12-20; Exhibit 6, 
Transtrum Deposition at page 36, lines 5-19. 
Concerning lunches: Exhibit 6, Transtrum Deposition at page 16, line 6 through page 
17, line 10 and page 28, lines 10-22; Exhibit 7, Bezzant Deposition at page 12, lines 16-19 and 
page 16, lines 17-22; Exhibit 4, Olsen Deposition at page 26, line 16 through page 27, line 11; 
page 28 lines 5-21; page 33, lines 4-9; Exhibit 5, Swenson Deposition at page 51, line 20 
through page 52, line 17; page 56, lines 19-23; page 57, line 11 through page 58, line 5. 
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did Burns know about the employee use of the cafe during working 
hours, they also had never objected such use.26 As Defendant 
Swenson testified when asked if the management knew about 
employee use of Frontier Cafe: "I am spre they did. The Lieutenants 
themselves went there."27 
In Clover, the Utah Supreme Court held that Mr. Zulliger's 
participation in skiing prior to work could be considered 
substantially within his hours of employment and that his skiing 
outside the location of his job put him substantially within spatial 
boundaries of his employment. Clover. 808 P.2d at 1041 and 1042-
43. In much the same way, evidence exists to support the conclusion 
that the Frontier Cafe could be considered substantially within the 
spatial boundaries Ms. Swenson's employment. 
C. Gloria Swenson's Rapid Trip to the Frontier Cafe to Obtain Lunch 
was Partly Motivated bv an Interest to Serve Her Employer. 
Defendant Burns. 
Finally, to be within the scope of employment, "the 
employee's conduct must be motivated, at least in part, by the 
purpose of serving the employer's interest." Birkner v. Salt Lake 
County. 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989). Therefore, in 
determining the employee's motivation for his or her conduct, the 
court looks carefully to the factual circumstances and the 
employee's state of mind. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 235, 
Comment (a) (1958). 
In this case, Ms. Swenson's trip to the Frontier Cafe consisted 
of little more than a short break from work. Although she picked up 
26 See Exhibit 6, Transtrum Deposition at page 44, lines 3-23; Exhibit 3, Mayne Deposition at 
page 60, line 13 through page 61, line 16. 
27 &g& Exhibit 5, Swenson Deposition at page 43, lines 9-16. Sejiajgo. Exhibit 7, Bezzant 
Deposition at page 18, lines 14-23. 
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a cup of soup, she did not eat it on the premises nor did she stay 
longer than enough time to pay for the item. In this sense, her 
deviation from work cannot be considered in the same category as a 
lunch break, rather it resembles more a latrine break in time and in 
distance. See W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Tort §70, 
at 503-04 (5th ed. 1984) ("Certain activities for the personal 
benefit of the employee, such as going to the toilet ... are quite 
generally recognized as so necessary, usual, closely tied in with the 
work, that they are held not to constitute deviations from the 
employment."). 
Moreover, Ms. Swenson's actions indicate a state of mind 
focused primarily on her employer's benefit. For example, she did 
not take her break at her convenience. Rather, as Ms. Swenson 
testified, she was concerned about discharging her duties: 
Okay. It was busy, usually is at that station. 
Trucks are coming real heavy. They are backed up clear 
to the highway. About quarter after 11:00 -- you almost 
-- like there is 20 minutes you will get a break. I guess 
the truckers go to lunch is all we can figure. 
Well, it would come at different times, but at 
about a quarter after I asked, Oly, I says, Are your ready 
for lunch. And he says, No, I don't think I have or want 
one today. And I says, Okay, it looks like there is a break 
out there. I think I will go get me a cup of soup. 
Exhibit 5, Swenson Deposition at page 17, lines 14-25. In addition 
Mr. Olsen, the guard stationed with Ms. Swenson the day of the 
accident, recalled that Ms. Swenson intended to walk to the cafe and 
then changed her mind, stating, "I'll take the car so I can get back 
quicker ...." Exhibit 4, Olsen Deposition at page 30, lines 15-16. 
Although Ms. Swenson decided to take a break and pick up a cup of 
soup, her concern about timing and method of travel, as well as her 
use of the nearest facility, indicate that her conduct was primarily 
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motivated by an interest to serve her employer.28 
In further analyzing whether the employee's conduct seeks to 
serve the employer's interest, the Court in Clover v. Snowbird Ski 
Resort explained that several variations of the Birkner test have 
been used. The Court also noted that these other approaches do not 
substitute for the basic Birkner analysis, rather they provide 
assistance in particular factual settings. 808 P.2d at 1040-41. 
Although the Court discussed the first approach, the "dual 
purpose doctrine," it concluded that the facts in Clover are better 
analyzed under the second approach, the personal detour cases. Id. at 
1041-42. This analysis involves circumstances where the employee 
carries out duties assigned by the employer and in the process 
deviates from the duties for a personal reason. The issue in such 
cases focuses on whether the employee abandons his or her 
employment in meeting the personal objectives, and thereby acts 
outside the scope of employment. When a question exists as to 
whether the employee's conduct constituted an abandonment or only 
a slight deviation, the court must leave the issue for the jury. ]£. at 
1042. 
In applying the personal detour approach, the Clover Court 
listed several factors which led it to conclude that Mr. Zulliger, the 
employee, had not abandoned his employment sufficiently to exempt 
the jury from deciding the issue. First the Court noted that a jury 
could reasonably believe that since Mr. Zulliger was skiing his last 
run, he had resumed his return to work. id.. The Court emphasized 
this factor stating, "if the employee has resumed the duties of 
28 C_L 1A Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation. § 15.52. Professor Larson notes 
that in Workers' Compensation cases an employee falls within the scope of employment when: 
the lunch ... is undertaken under special circumstances to suit the employer's 
convenience, as .... where the employee was told to rush out, get a quick bite to 
eat, and hurry back because of the pressure of work. ... Here the very making 
of a lightning excursion for lunch is an effort expended in the employer's 
interest to conserve his time. 
14 
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employment, the employee is then 'about the employer's business' 
and the employee's actions will "motivated, at least in part, by the 
purpose of serving the employer's interest." Id, quoting Burton v. La 
Duke. 61 Utah 78, 210 P. 978, 979-81 (1922). 
The second factor stressed by the Court directly addressed Mr. 
Zulliger's decision to continue skiing after carrying out instructions 
to inspect the second restaurant. The Court noted that in cases 
holding that the employee had abandoned his employment, the court 
focuses on whether the actions are "in direct conflict with the 
employer's directions and policy." 808 P.2d at 1042, citing Cannon 
v. Goodvear Tire & Rubber Co.. 60 Utah 346, 208 P. 519 (1922). In 
choosing to ski, Mr. Zulliger's actions did not directly conflict with 
Snowbird's instructions. As the Court pointed out, Snowbird issued 
its employees season ski passes as part of their compensation. 
In this case, Ms. Swenson's conduct analyzed under the 
personal detour approach29 also demonstrates that reasonable 
minds could believe that she had not abandoned her employment for a 
personal errand. As with Mr. Zulliger, Ms. Swenson was returning to 
her post at the time of the collision. Significantly, the Clover Court 
dismissed the fact that the accident occurred above the restaurant 
where Mr. Zulliger's employer had sent him. The Court noted that in 
cases, like this one, where the accident occurs substantially within 
the normal spatial boundaries of employment, "employees may be 
29 Defendant may attempt to claim that the facts in this case warrant analysis under the first 
approach--the dual purpose doctrine. Even under this method, however, Ms. Swenson's 
conduct falls within the scope of employment. In the dual purpose doctrine, the court focuses 
on whether the employee's actions are primarily personal or business oriented. As already 
discussed in the second and third paragraphs of Subsection C, Ms. Swenson acted primarily out 
of concern for her employer. Her momentary break to pick up a cup of soup was taken at its 
convenience and in a manner most likely to return Ms. Swenson quickly to her work. 
Moreover, the supplementary part of the dual purpose doctrine, the "second trip test" 
does not apply in this case. The Clover court notes that the test is used in situations where the 
employee makes a trip away from work. 808 P.2d at 1041. Here Ms. Swenson's break from 
her post cannot be considered a trip anymore than a latrine break, or a coffee break might be 
considered a trip. 
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within the scope of employment if, after a personal detour, they 
return to their duties and an accident occurs." 808 P.2d at 1042. 
Likewise, under the second factor, a jury could reasonably 
believe that Ms. Swenson had not abandoned her employment. As 
Clover explained, a substantial departure from employment will 
involve actions taken in direct conflict with the employer's 
directions and policy. Id.. At the time of the accident in this case, 
Burns issued no policy, oral or written on breaks or the use of the 
Frontier Cafe.30 Nor had it given any instructions not to use the 
cafe.31 In fact, both management as well as employees resorted to 
the cafe for lunch and restroom breaks, and for meetings.32 
CONCLUSION 
A motion for summary judgment requires that no disputed 
issues of material facts exist so that the court can rule for the 
moving party as a matter of law. When appropriately used, the 
motion can save the time, effort and expense of a trial. The Utah 
Supreme Court has warned, however, that in cases where disputed 
issues need to be resolved, "the granting of such a motion fails of 
that objective, and the hoped for advantages are not only lost, but 
there actually results a greater expenditure of time and effort ..." 
Western Pacific Transport Co. v. Beehive State Agricultural Co-Qp. 
597 P.2d 854, 855 (Utah 1979). Based upon Defendant Burns 
incomplete and disputed statement of facts, this is such a case. 
Not only does Defendant Burns fail to meet Rule 56(c)'s factual 
requirements, it also fails to establish that as a matter of law, it is 
entitled to judgment. For these reasons and all of those discussed 
30 See Exhibit 3, Mayne Deposition at page 38, line 17 through page 39, line 24; page 70, line 
25 through page 71, line 7. 
31 See Exhibit 3, Mayne Deposition at page 44, line 24 through page 45, line 5. 
32 Sfifi n. 25. 
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above and in the official court record, Plaintiff Jeff Christensen and 
Kyle James Fausett respectfully request that the Court grant this 
appeal and set aside the trial court's order of summary judgment. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JEFF CHRISTENSEN et al 
Plaintiffs, CASE NUMBER: CV 89 278 
vs. RULING 
GLORIA SWENSON et al 
Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501, on the 
motion of Def Burns International Security Services seeking 
Summary Judgment. The Court has reviewed the file, considered 
the memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel, and 
upon being advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Said motion is granted for the following reasons: 
(a) In the view of the Court there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that said 
Def is entitled to Judgment as a matter of 
law. 
(b) That in going to the Frontier Cafe to buy 
lunch, Gloria Swenson's conduct was not as 
a matter of law of the general kind for which 
she was employed to perform by Def Burns. 
(c) That the conduct of Swenson in going to the 
Frontier Cafe was not as a matter of law 
within the ordinary spatial boundaries of 
her employment with Burns. 
(d) That the conduct of Swenson in going to the 
Frontier Cafe was not as a matter of law 
motivated in whole or in part by the purpose 
of serving Burns' interest as the employer 
of Swenson. 
(e) That in the opinion of the Court the activity 
of Swenson in leaving her post at Gate 4 to 
go to the Frontier Cafe to purchase lunch was 
so clearly without the scope of her employment 
with Burns that reasonable minds could not 
differ as to such conclusion. 
Dated this ^ _ day of November, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
"t^CC^^^^^ 
CULLEN a. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
cc: Thomas Patton, Esq. 
Lynn Harris, Esq. 
Mark Williams, Esq. 
Stanley R. Smith, Esq. 
EXHIBIT 2 
EXCERPTS OF KIM S. HANCEY DEPOSITION 
they doing everything besides that. 
Q (By Mr. Harris) No. I just want to know, in 
your mind this 10 to 15 minutes — I'm just trying to 
decide what goes on in those 10 to 15 minutes — if it's 
acceptable to use the restroom and have a cup of coffee and 
get some fresh air, you know, whatever constitutes a break 
for somebody, if that is permissible or impermissible or 
A No, we allow that. They're welcome to get a cup 
of coffee or candy bar. There's vending machines there. 
Q And actually, as I understand it leave gate 
4, actually leave the island for 10 or 15 minutes? 
A And walk outside, yeah. The restroom is in the 
next building. 
Q The next office building? 
A Yes. 
Q But they don't have to take their 10 or 15 
minute break in the island at the gate post? 
A No. 
Q Now, are you aware of any written guidelines 
with regards to — strike that. I've already asked that. 
Are you aware of any oral guidelines as to how a lunch 
break is to be taken, how someone is, while they «re o n 
that eight hour shift, is to consume food? 
A They are to bring it with them. it's their 
responsibility that they feed themselves. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
A In looking at it that way. 
Q That's a yes? 
A Yeah. 
Q Now, are you familiar with any Utah State laws 
or industrial commission guidelines, laws or regulations 
with regards to whether employees have to — what type and 
what manner of breaks or lunch breaks they're supposed to 
get in a work day? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q And tell me about that. 
A My knowledge, they are allowed time for their 
breaks, which we provide them. 
Q And tell me by "breaks," what kind of breaks are 
you referring to? 
A Running to the restroom. 
Q Any other type of breaks? 
A No, 
Q Is there anything in there where they are also 
allowed a rest break, or what's commonly called a coffee 
break? 
A No. 
Q Is there anything in there where the guidelines 
or regulations suggest that they are entitled to a lunch 
break on an eight hour shift? 
A They are entitled to time for lunch, to my 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
knowledge of it, but it's not necessarily something they 
need to leave the facility to do* 
Q As I understand it, as it's set up, when people 
log in initially and then log out at the end of an eight 
hour shift, there is no logging out for any of these type 
of breaks, correct? 
A Right. 
Q And if one is going to eat a lunch or take a 
lunch break that is while they are still on duty? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q And still responsible to carry out the functions 
they have been assigned? 
A Right. 
Q Now, I assume that if you've got two people at 
gate 4 on the day shift rather than just a single person at 
a gate, that that would not be a situation where the roving 
person would come around and provide any type of relief for 
a restroom break? 
A No need for it, but it is available if they need 
it. 
Q But it isn't routinely done, is it? 
A No. 
Q And routinely, are you aware of a practice or 
oral policy as to how long a restroom break can take and be 
reasonable? 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
A It's understood down there 10, 15 minutes. 
Q And as I understand it, they don't log out for 
those 10 or 15 minutes? 
A No, they don't need to. They*re not leaving the 
facility. 
Q And they are readily accessible if they're 
needed? 
A Correct. 
Q They can — wherever they are taking their 
restroom break they can be gotten very quickly? 
A Yes. 
Q And thereby respond to what needs to be 
responded to? 
A Right. 
Q Hence, they don't need to check out? 
A No. 
Q In addition to a — when we talk about this 10 
or 15 minute break, is that sort of a half restroom break 
half coffee break, rest break? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Well — 
Q (By Mr. Harris) Or is it just a restroom break? 
MR. WILLIAMS: I'll object to the form of the 
question, vague and ambiguous. If you understand it, go 
ahead and answer. 
THE WITNESS: I don't. Are you asking me are 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
EXHIBIT 3 
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1 break, breakfast break, whatever the shift you're on, what 
2 arrangements are made for that type of break? 
3 A Only as time allows. They can eat their lunch 
4 but there is not a specific set time or schedule for such 
5 event. 
6 Q And is it also like latrine and coffee break, 
7 thafs not something that they would check in and out, log 
8 in and out? 
9 A That's correct. 
10 Q They would remain basically on duty during that 
11 period of time? 
12 A Correct. 
13 MR. WILLIAMS: I'm going to object to the form 
14 of the question as vague and ambiguous in it does not 
15 define space or time. If you want to clarify that, if not 
16 we'll clarify, but I want that objection on the record. 
17 Q (By Mr. Harris) I could not find, after reading 
18 this inch and a half material, anywhere where it talked 
19 about breaks, lunch breaks, coffee breaks, even latrine 
20 breaks. Are you aware of any — in any of the information 
21 that's been supplied to me as to whether there are any 
22 written policies, procedures, post orders, any documented 
23 evidence of break policy, lunch break policy, coffee break 
24 policy, latrine break policy? 
25 A Not that I'm aware of. 
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Q Have you ever had that in Burns Security? 
A Not that I'm aware of. 
Q Okay. If there isn't anything in writing is 
there any oral policy at Geneva back in 1988, prior to the 
date of this accident, as to what the oral — first of all, 
was there any oral policies with regard to breaks: lunch, 
coffee, latrine? 
A I don't know what oral policy would have been in 
place if one in 1988. 
Q I don't understand your answer. You're saying 
you're not sure whether there was or was not one? 
A I'm not sure. 
Q And if there was one you're not sure what it 
was? 
A I'm not sure if there was one what it stated. 
Q And who would I ask that? Who could tell me 
that? 
A Probably Kim Hancey and the captain. 
Q Generally are there any oral policies or 
instructions that come from your level down to the captain 
and Hancey level with regards to breaks? 
A No, none that I can recall. 
Q Not in your full six years? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q Had you ever worked at gate 4 before? 
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A Not for the personnel at the north gate. 
Q You don't know one way or the other? 
A I don't know that they have, no* 
Q Or that they haven't? 
A Or that they haven't prior to this accident, no. 
Q Do you know whether — there are the other gates 
down more towards the Center Street area of Geneva, are you 
familiar with what I'm talking about? 
A Yes. 
Q Where the Phillips station is? 
A Yes. 
Q There's also been a restaurant and a cafe there 
for a number of years as well? 
A 
Q . 
Security 
latrine 
about an 
there to 
A 
particul 
Q 
name of 
A 
now. A 
Correct. 
Are you familiar as 
employees have utiliz 
break, coffee break or 
to whether any Burns 
ed that restaurant for 
lunch break; and I'm 
a 
talking 
individual basis rather than simply going over 
pick up meals? 
Yes, in fact, I've 
ar restaurant. 
And that restaurant 
it. 
I believe it's Low-
real sleezy place. 
conducted meetings at 
is? I don't remember 
that 
the 
Downs is what it's called 
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truck stop, cafe or it's predecessor — I know that's gone 
through a lot of construction — was it opened during that 
period of time? 
A Yes, it was, 
Q And did you personally ever have occasion to 
frequent that establishment for coffee breaks or lunch 
breaks in your eight month — 
A In the scope of my duty, yes. 
Q And in the scope of your duty would be what? 
A At the time that it was a USX operation it was 
the responsibility of one of the roving patrolman to pick 
up and distribute lunches throughout the — mill throughout 
the USX employees that were being held over for overtime 
and I on numerous occasions have picked up and distributed 
lunches. 
Q Okay. And that would be — and that was done 
either by you or by whoever was involved in the roving 
A Correct. 
Q — assignment? While you were working at gate 
4, ever have an occasion while you were on shift still 
booked in and not booked out to personally, not for 
overtime people or for — as in the roving capacity, ever 
go to that cafe or its predecessor for a break, coffee 
break or lunch break? 
A It's possible. I don't recall specifically. 
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1 A I don't think so, no* 
2 Q Fire? 
3 A I don't believe so unless it was of great 
4 magnitude. 
5 Q If they were needed and the captain required 
6 them to then they would leave? 
7 A They would respond. 
8 Q Fire extinguisher inspection and refills? 
9 A They would not. 
10 Q Gate openings? 
11 A No. They would, yes. 
12 Q Patrol breaches of security? 
13 A Patrol the immediate area, no, no. The answer 
14 to that would be no. 
15 Q Other than generally to go out and patrol the 
16 whole area no, correct? 
17 A They do not. 
18 Q And other than if they were going to generally 
19 inspect a stone's throw around them, then they could; we 
20 already talked about that? 
21 A No, at that specific gate they would not either. 
22 I They wouldn't do that either. 
23 | Q Can you give me a general yes there would be 
24 | times when they would leave and then — I tried to get 
25 | specific about the list that we went down. Are there other 
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reasons when they would — one person would leave? 
A Yes, for a latrine break. 
Q Okay. 
A That's the only time I can think of. 
Q And at gate 4, where do they scurry to? 
A There's a building, an office building that's 
located right here and they would leave — 
Q Why don't you write office building right next 
to that if you would, please? 
A They would go to here or they could come down to 
here. There's a restroom facility in there as well. 
Q You're pointing to the foot traffic post? 
A Correct. 
Q Are you personally aware of occasions when 
someone during the day shift has had to respond to a 
medical emergency, one of the two at gate 4? 
A None that come to mind. 
Q Am I understanding that what you're saying is 
your general understanding is that they wouldn't, but they 
might, there may be — there may have been an occasion 
where they could have? 
A They could have? That I'm not aware of. 
Q Your answer would be the same with regard to 
fire? 
A Correct. 
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Q Would your answer be the same with regard to 
inspection of fire extinguishers? 
A Correct. 
Q Gate option? 
A Correct. 
Q And patrol? 
A Correct. 
Q Now, the fire station that you talked about, 
where the captain's office is, what is that, at the fire 
station I assume fire trucks and fire — 
A Fire trucks, fire extinguishers, ambulance. 
Q And where is that located at the plant? 
A Centrally located. There's actually two fire 
stations. 
Q And I assume if there were some type of a fire 
or a problem, then the different parties who are assigned 
that task would then respond to one of the two fire 
stations, get their equipment and go and attend to the 
problem? 
A Correct. 
Q What type of communications are set up between 
the different officers? 
A Telephone at all of the gates, two-way radios at 
some of the gates. 
Q Do you remember which gates? 
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A Gate 1 is equipped with both telephone and 
radio. Gate 2, I believe, is two-way and phone. Gate 3 is 
strictly phone. Gate 4 is definitely phone and possibly a 
two-way radio. Gate 5 phone, and gate 6 could possibly be 
radio and phone. 
Q Are the vehicles also equipped with — 
A Yes, they are. 
Q — with a radio so they can speak to the 
different posts? 
A Yes, they are. 
Q And I assume the captain's station? 
A Yes. 
Q Which is at the one fire station? 
A Correct. 
Q There is some documentation about how different 
officers are assigned hand-held but they are hip held 
two-way radios? 
A I don't understand the question. 
Q Are the individual officers also assigned 
radios, the ability to speak? 
A Depending — no, not everyone has a radio, no. 
Q You know which ones do and which ones don't? 
A The gate 1 is a base station. It's not 
portable. Gate 2, I believe, is a portable. Gate 4 if 
they have one would be a portable; I'm not sure that they 
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And generally, other than the obvious means of 
communication, do you have some general specific purpose of 
those radios, what they're for, what they provide? 
A The radio is communication to alert and respond 
officers to various locations for emergency or 
investigation. 
Q Anything else? 
A I can't think of anything, any other reason that 
they would have them. 
Q Would it be just the general reason of keeping 
in touch, having the ability to keep in touch with 
everybody all at once? 
A Correct. 
Q When one takes a latrine break do they have to 
chart out? I noticed on a lot of the log books where it 
said you are in, you're out, you're here and those 
different type of places. Do they have to log out to take 
a latrine break? 
A No, they do not. 
Q When they report on their shifts here at Geneva 
is it a straight eight hour shift? 
A No, some of them vary. Some of the gates are 
strictly shift change, which is for part-time personnel 
only. Some shifts the lieutenants work are 10 hour shifts, 
not all, but some. So for the most part the shifts are 
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eight hours but there are some that are two and three hours 
for shift change and lieutenants, I believe, one day a week 
work — one day a week work a 10 hour shift. 
Q And as I understand it, when somebody comes they 
have — if they get there a few minutes early they have to 
log in and say Jane Doe is here? 
A Yes. 
Q And then they have the situation where the one 
on duty transfers keys or whatever else needs to be 
transferred, that's noted? 
A That's correct. 
Q And he says off duty? 
A That's correct. 
Q And then the Jane Doe at that point in time 
charts in and says they're on duty? 
A Correct. 
Q And do I understand it they remain on duty for 
the entire eight hours until such time or however long 
their shift is until they leave? 
A Correct. 
Q And then they would chart out? 
A Correct. 
Q And in the same reverse procedure that we just 
talked about? 
A Correct. 
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Q And as I understand it they do not log out for 
latrine breaks? 
A They do not. 
Q Okay. Are there any other types of breaks that 
are allowed? 
A There are not that I'm aware of. 
Q Okay. There are no procedures? A lot of 
companies have 10 minute breaks in the morning and 10 
minute breaks in the afternoon, coffee break type of 
situation. 
A 
Q 
There are none that are 
Are they allowed those 
i scheduled. 
type of breaks? I guess 
it would be depending on the circumstances; the 
requirements of the gate have to be met and if 
there's no 
A 
Q 
break? 
That's right. 
And if it's not so buss r
 and there's 
opportunity then they can take a coffee break? 
A 
Q 
they would 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Correct. 
And that would also be 
not log out? 
Correct. 
Similar to the latrine 
Correct. 
Now, with regards to a 
they 
an 
the type of break 
break? 
lunch break, 
're busy 
where 
dinner 
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break, breakfast break, whatever the shift you're on, what 
arrangements are made for that type of break? 
A Only as time allows. They can eat their lunch 
but there is not a specific set time or schedule for such 
event. 
Q And is it also like latrine and coffee break, 
that's not something that they would check in and out, log 
in and out? 
A That's correct. 
Q They would remain basically on duty during that 
period of time? 
A Correct. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I'm going to object to the form 
of the question as vague and ambiguous in it does not 
define space or time. If you want to clarify that, if not 
we'll clarify, but I want that objection on the record. 
Q (By Mr. Harris) I could not find, after reading 
this inch and a half material, anywhere where it talked 
about breaks, lunch breaks, coffee breaks, even latrine 
breaks. Are you aware of any — in any of the information 
that's been supplied to me as to whether there are any 
written policies, procedures, post orders, any documented 
evidence of break policy, lunch break policy, coffee break 
policy, latrine,break policy? 
A Not that I'm aware of. 
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today, disciplined in any manner? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q Prior to this accident? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q And tell me about that. 
A I observed one of my patrol vehicles on State 
Street in Orem at approximately 11 p.m. 11:30, the time and 
date I don't know. I immediately, the following day, 
contacted the captain, and I instructed him I wanted to 
know why that vehicle was uptown. And they determined that 
that individual had slipped home for a minute, and he was 
disciplined for it. 
Q All right. Other than that occurrence, are you 
familiar as to whether anyone had ever been disciplined who 
had been working at gate 4 on the day shift and had left 
momentarily to go to the Frontier Cafe, pick up their lunch 
and bring it back and to eat it there on the post? 
A I don't recall any. 
Q Was it ever discussed with you by your captains, 
lieutentants, client service supervisors, as to whether one 
should be disciplined for doing something that I just 
described? 
A I don't recall ever discussing that with either 
of those two. 
Q Did you discuss it with anybody? 
61 
A Not that I recall. 
Q Do you know whether Gloria Swenson was 
disciplined after arising out of the circumstances here on 
July 26, 1988? 
A I don't recall. I don't believe that she was. 
Q Was that a decision by you? 
A It could have been. I don't recall why she 
would have been or why she wasn't. I'm almost positive 
there was no discipline, there was no discipline 
administered by me, and I'm not aware of any by supervisor 
captain, lieutenants. 
Q That would have gone across your desk? 
A That's right. 
Q Wsis it ever discussed with you as to whether 
there should be discipline or not under these circumstances 
with Gloria Swenson? 
A No, it was not. 
Q Did you have an opportunity to review her 
employee file? 
A I'm vaguely familiar with some of the items that 
are in it, yes. 
Q I couldn't find any kind of written reprimand or 
probation. 
A I don't recall disciplinary problems with her. 
Q Was there any type of verbal policy that you're 
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A I don't. 
Q I see "appendix" it even says. 
A The basics are the — this is a workbook that 
the officers view when they are watching a video, make 
notations during the video, and at the end there's a test 
that's administered. 
The other document that you have is our policy 
and procedure for the Salt Lake district but I'm not sure. 
Q But you're not aware of what this Basic 
Employment Guide referred to here is? 
A No. 
Q It's not something that you've referred to or 
worked w^ ith? 
A Not that I recall even specifically. What it's 
called Basic Employment Guide? I'm not familiar with what 
that is. I'm assuming it must be — 
Q It says, "see appendix Basic Employment Guide 
for 8 Step Hiring Process"? 
A I'm not familiar. 
Q In looking at the disciplinary policy here in 
the handbook for security officers, I think there's also a 
disciplinary policy in the regulations, policies and 
procedures? 
Uh-huh. 
Q It seems like they went over each other. In 
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reviewing those, I'm sure you're familiar with them. I'm 
happy to let you look at them on page 44, 45, 46 and 47. I 
could not find anything in there that referred to breaks, 
lunch breaks, violations of with regards to those type of 
issues. I just wanted to make sure that I wasn't missing 
something. 
A I don't recall any in here that's listed. 
Q And while we're at it, if you could pull out 
page 17 of the regulations of policies and procedure. It 
also has a laundry list there of items on two, three pages 
that — and I would like to ask the same question. I 
couldn't find anything there either. 
A What specifically are you referring to on 17? 
Q I'm just wondering — 17, 18 and 19 as far as 
that, over to page 20, if there are any topics in there 
that are subjects for disciplinary action that refer to 
breaks, lunch breaks, coffee breaks, those issues? 
A None that I recall. I don't see any. 
Q You're welcome to take a minute and look at all 
of those to be fair to you. 
A And the question being specifically breaks, 
lunch breaks. 
Q Yeah, somehow if you violated the, you know, the 
standard policies for those, concerning those — 
A On page 19, item 3. 
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Q And let me just clarify that answer. You 
indicated yes there have been times where you've actually 
held meetings there? 
A Yes. 
Q And I assume those are meetings with the captain 
and lieutenants? 
A Yes, exactly. 
Q Not with the general security officers? 
A Not that I ever recall, no. 
Q And let me ask a little more specific question. 
Are you aware either through your lieutenants or captains 
or through Kim Hancey as to whether the Low-Down has been 
used by any of the security officers for a latrine break, 
coffee break or lunch break? You're not aware one way or 
the other? 
A No, I'm not aware of quick, short or otherwise. 
Q Do you know if there are any other restaurants 
in close proximity on Geneva Road other than the Frontier 
that's here on Exhibit 2 and the Low-Down? 
A I don't believe there are. 
Q I guess unless you wanted to eat at Bunkers Feed 
or somewhere near Fourth North. 
A Dairy mash. 
Q Get some Dairy mash. Do you know if prior to 
this, the date of this accident, that was July 26, 1988, as 
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to whether there were any written post orders that would 
prohibit a security officer from utilizing either of these 
two restaurants as a coffee break place, latrine break 
place or to stop to get a quick lunch? 
A Specific instructions, I'm not aware of any. 
Q And the same question with regards to any 
non-written instructions? 
A I am aware there are has been verbal statements 
that they are not to leave the shift, leave their site. We 
have a number of our documents that state that they are not 
to leave their assigned post unless it's the end of the 
shift or properly relieved. 
Q And do I understand — and I think I understand 
that generally. What I'm trying to do is understand if 
that applies to latrine breaks. 
A And I don't know what — I don't understand the 
question. 
Q Obviously if you assign people to a post you 
would like to have them there to make sure that the job is 
being taken care of, and the employer is being — his needs 
are being satisfied, correct? 
A Let me clarify, maybe that will answer your 
question. All of the gates are equipped with a restroom 
facility at the post with the exception of the north gate, 
that being the island gate. It does not have the restroom. 
EXHIBIT 4 
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said no one's going to leave Geneva property and go anywhere 
to get lunches basically. I mean I don't remember the exact 
words, but it said don't do that any more, effective 
immediately don't do this any more/ but prior to the time of 
Gloria's accident do you know of anyone ever getting 
reprimanded for doing that? 
A No, not that I can recall. 
Q Do you recall anyone ever coming up and saying you 
guys can't do that/ no one here is to go over to the Frontier 
Cafe and get a lunch? 
A Not personally that I can recall anyone ever telling 
me that/ but I can't answer for the other people or the other-
lieutenants on the other shifts. 
Q But it is fair to say that your manuals say you are 
not to leave your post while on duty, true? 
A True. 
Q Were you on duty the day this accident took place? 
A Yes. 
Q Were you the other guard at gate four? 
A Yes. 
Q As best as you can, okay, and I realize we're asking 
you to go back now until July of 1988 which isn't really fair 
to anybody, all right, but asking you to do that as best you 
can, tell me what you remember about what happened that day. 
And obviously I don't want you to start at 8:00 a.m. in the 
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A Yeah, that would be. 
Q And if they walk 70 yards back to a truck to see 
whether or not there is something on the truck that matches or 
doesn't match, even though they're not right at gate four, 
they're still considered to be at their post; isn't that true? 
A Yes. 
Q Because they're still fulfilling their 
responsibilities; isn't that true? 
A Yes. 
Q And they're still wearing their uniform and being 
highly visible; isn't that true? 
A That's true. 
Q Now, you were also expected to basically bring in 
your lunch and eat at your post; isn't that true? 
A Well, we normally brought our lunch to eat, yes. 
Q Okay, you normally brought your lunch to eat. What 
happens if you normally didn't bring it one day? One day you 
didn't bring your junch. What did you do? 
A Well, you either went without or had someone get you 
one . 
Q Who would get you one? 
A Well, sometimes the guard in the car. 
Q Where would the guard in the car go to get you some 
Junch? 
A Across the street to the cafe. 
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Q So it was not unreasonable to think that the guard 
in the car might go get lunch over at the cafe and bring it to 
you? Would that be true? 
A Well, if the time came, and once in awhile it may 
happen, but — 
Q Did it happen once in awhile? 
A Well, never to me, but I can't answer the others, 
but that would — 
Q Did you ever see it happen for anybody else at gate 
•ifour? That one's tough, isn't it? 
A Yeah. 
Q That one's tough because it calls for you to 
remember a long time back, and also that's a tough one because 
that's really the construction of the whole lawsuit, right, 
everything here in a nutshell? Do you personally know of 
other people going over to the Frontier Cafe to get lunches 
for guards at gate four? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Are you saying for other guards other 
than themselves personally? 
Q (By Mr. Patton) I'm saying do you know of any 
guards going over there for themselves or going over there for 
others to get lunches for guards who are working gate four? 
Now, you've indicated it never happened for you, and I'm 
assuming that's why you're still working there, okay? Because 
obviously they're very happy with you, all right? But I want 
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1 to know if you ever personally saw it happen. 
2 A No, because during my time of the shift I had, no, 
3 there was no time that I can recall someone else that I worked 
4 with calling to have anybody go pick them up a lunch. 
5 Q Do you ever remember seeing anyone working your 
6 shift run across the street or drive across the street and get 
7 their own? 
8 A Well, yes. 
9 Q And who was that? 
10 A Well, that's when this accident happened, the day 
11 that Gloria went. 
12 Q Was there anyone besides Gloria who ever went and 
13 did that? Not you, but did you see anyone else ever do that 
14 besides Gloria? 
15 A Well, I know of incidents where some have done it. 
16 Q Do you know the names of some of these people who 
17 have done it? 
18 A Well, there's only two or three of us that have 
19 worked that gate very long and there's others come and go, and 
20 for three, four years to try and remember their names, I just 
21 don't remember them. 
22 Q Do you know if Gloria saw other people doing it? 
23 I A I can't answer that for her. 
24 | Q Well, see, I know for a fact that there was that 
25 I little communication that came out after the accident that 
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Q Do you consider that to be off your post? 
A Well, yeah, it would have to be off because itfs not 
on the premises. 
Q If anyone went over on their time as a Burns guard, 
would you consider that to be on their own time, if they went 
over to the cafe to pick up lunch for themselves? 
A Well, yes, I'd have to say that they would be on 
their own time. 
Q Would you consider that to be their personal errand 
for themselves, as opposed — 
MR. PATTON: Objection, calls for speculation, calls 
for a legal conclusion. That's what the issues are all about. 
MR. WILLIAMS: You can go ahead and answer. You've 
answered his questions about legal conclusions. 
THE WITNESS: Repeat that for me. 
Q (By Mr. Williams) Would you consider a guard going 
over to pick up lunch to be on their own time, personal 
errand, as opposed to company business? 
MR. PATTON: Same objection. 
THE WITNESS: Well, let me put it this way. It's a 
little different than running over to the billing office to go 
to the John, but I think that it takes about the same amount 
of time. The only difference that I can see is the fact that 
the cafe is off the premises. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. No further questions. 
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the form of the question as being vague and ambiguous, as well 
as argumentative. 
Q (By Mr. Patton) Isn't it true? 
A I can only answer for who I work with. See, I work 
with one person at a time, other people come on. I canft 
answer for what they do after I leave, whether they call. I 
could go over and get a lunch or have someone pick it up. I 
can only answer for the time that I am in the guard house 
myself with someone else. If someone else does it — 
Q And you've worked there seven years, true? Now, 
sir, you're not a party to this action. 
A Oh, I understand that. 
Q You're not a good guy or bad guy, not wearing a 
white or black hat. I'm just asking you, based on what you 
know to be the truth, and the fact of the matter is it really 
wasn't that unusual -- it may have been unusual for you, okay? 
But based on what you know and seven years of experience, it 
really wasn't that unusual for a guard at gate four, when 
there were two guards on duty, to call over to the Frontier 
Cafe and order food and rush over and get it and rush back; 
isn't that true? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Let me object. I think the use of 
the word isn't that unusual is vague and ambiguous and calls 
for an answer that could run the whole spectrum, and so I'm 
going to object on that basis. 
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morning. I want you to start just before Gloria leaves the 
gate, the exact Island gate itself, and what you remember she 
said, she did, what happened, where she went, whether she came 
back, whether or not you saw the accident, what happened. 
Just tell me everything you remember happening that day. 
A Well, I recall that she said she needed to have a 
little bite to eat because I donft think — as I recall, she 
may not have had a lunch that day, for whatever reason I don't 
know. She mentioned that I'll — normally we always call. 
Now, I can't recall whether she phoned ahead or not at that 
particular time. We were busy, but at least the incoming 
traffic were busy, and that's the side I was sitting on. So 
she says, well, I think I'll run over and grab a bowl of soup, 
whatever it was, and be right back. So she was going to walk, 
she started to going to walk, and she says, well, I'll take 
the car so I can get back quicker, and that's the last I seen 
her because after the accident I didn't see her for, I guess 
it was a good week or better after that. 
Q Did you see the accident? 
A No. I seen some confusion up there after, but I 
never seen the accident. 
Q Was she getting you any lunch or any rolls or any 
doughnuts while she was up there? 
A No. 
Q Just for herself? 
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Q Tell me, would you sometimes bring your lunch? 
A Sometimes. We had no policy that you could not leave 
or anything else. And we just went across the highway to get 
our lunches a lot of the time. 
Q When you say "we would go across the highway to get 
lunches", how often would you personally go across the highway? 
A I had probably made two or three trips, and then the 
different guys we worked with, we just took turns. One or the 
other of us would go. 
Q So this was something that you do occasionally but 
not every day; is that correct? 
A Not every day but it was often. 
Q Tell me where you considered your post to, be what 
you understood your post to be when you were a guard on duty at 
the island gate. 
A My duty? 
Q Yes. The area where you were supposed to work. 
A Was to, like I said, check in the trucks, check the 
loads, watch as they go out. 
MR. HARRIS: You mean like area, spatially versus 
Q Let me clarify that just so that we are all clear on 
the record. Where did you understand your area of work was to 
be when you were told you were stationed at the island gate? 
A Okay. We had a little TV screen in there so we 
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under glass with other stuff. We had it on the wall- We had it 
down at the gate. 
Q It was even in both locations? 
A Yes. It's at all the gates. There is a posting of 
all the restaurants around. 
Q Is that where you got the phone number is off that 
menu so you could call? 
A Yes. 
Q Now prior to the time of this accident, did you have 
knowledge one way or another as to whether the lieutenants, the 
supervisors, the people above you knew that you and, to your 
knowledge, others had gone, were going over to Frontier on 
occasion to get their lunch? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Objection. 
A I'm sure they did. The lieutenants themselves went 
there. 
Q There has been some testimony from other witnesses 
that there were even meetings held at the Frontier Cafe between 
the lieutenants and the captain and company officials from Salt 
Lake. Were you aware of that? 
A Yes, I was. I know a time Burns people have met and 
went there. 
Q Did you personally ever attend any type of a meeting, 
formal or informal, at the Frontier Cafe? 
A On duty? While I was on duty? 
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1 Program and Burns Regulations, Policies and procedures, I wasn't 
2 able to find anything that specifically dealt with lunch breaks 
3 or coffee breaks or — 
4 A I don't recall anything either. 
5 Q Do you remember any policy one way or another on 
6 lunch breaks or — and by policy I mean oral policy, spoken or 
7 written, on lunch breaks or coffee breaks or potty breaks, 
8 anything to do with that. 
9 A When you can get them, you take them. That's all I 
10 was ever told and that was, like I say, many days if — 
11 Q Do you know if during the time you were employed at 
12 Burns as to whether the lieutenants themselves in their own cars 
13 went to the Frontier Cafe and picked up food or lunches for any 
14 of the Burns employees? 
15 A In their own car? 
16 Q In their company car while they were on duty. 
17 A Not for us, but maybe for the lieutenants and the 
18 captain's meeting. 
19 Q As I understand it, there are occasions when there is 
20 
21 A I brought food back to my own lieutenant many times. 
22 Q From Frontier Cafe? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And he would pick that up and eat it in his car or 
25 sit there in the island post? 
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Q Were there occasions when — you have testified a 
couple of times today that there were occasions when people at 
Gate 4 would take turns to go over to the Frontier Cafe and pick 
up lunches for each other, correct? 
A Yes. 
And you talked about how you did that? 
Yes. 
There were tiroes when you walked to go do that? 
Yes. 
And times you took your own car? 
Yes. 
And were there other times when the other person 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
walked? 
Yes. A 
Q And other times when the other person got in his own 
car to go do that? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you have information one way or the other, yes or 
no, as to whether the lieutenants or any of the other 
supervisors knew of this situation where you and other parties 
at Gate 4 used their own vehicles to hustle over to the Frontier 
A I'm sure they did. 
Q In looking through the documents that they gave me, 
and, again, that's a handbook for security officers — you are 
welcome to look at this stuff — Burns Security Orientation 
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A We would usually meet at the fire station. This is, 
like I say, on graveyard when things were slow or something, but 
I did actually bring food back for my lieutenant. 
Q Gate 4 during the day shift has two people, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Then there are times when there is only one person? 
A Swing shift. 
Q And other gates there is only one person at the gates 
when they are open, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you have any information one way or another if the 
lieutenants would have picked up lunches for the single staff 
people, in other words, where they couldn't leave the place 
unmanned and go over and get something to eat? 
A My lieutenant didn't. Usually Car 7 and Car 8 
brought it back to all of us. 
Q Including the other — 
A We would always check with the one on the gate, Would 
you like something. 
Q And that's not just Gate 4; that would be the other 
gates as well? 
A Yes. Sometimes on the graveyard we would always 
check with Gate 4. My lieutenant was a real stickler, you keep 
in touch with everybody, make sure everybody is okay. We always 
would check in on the Gate 4 person up there by themself. Gate 
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2 is clear down the other end of the plant. 
Q And as you saw it, in Car 7 and 8 that was part of 
your responsibilities, to check on these folks and make sure 
they are all right? 
A Yes. 
Q Including if they need something to eat or something 
to drink? There are occasions — 
A
 I don't understand that as policy, no, but if we were 
going to get us a drink, yes, we would ask them. 
Q And that came from instructions from your lieutenant? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Objection. Leading. 
A
 To make sure everyone is okay, yes. We had radios. 
Even if it was — there was many times we would be called, Hey, 
go check Gate 4. I can't reach him on the radio. He had no 
relxef. if
 n e w e nt to the restroom or something else and we 
couldn't reach him, of course you suspected something is wrong. 
Q- There has been some testimony in this record about 
radios and it's still not — at least not clear in my mind. At 
the time of this accident in '88, July of '88, what type of 
radio system did you have there between the — 
A
 Absolutely none to the island gate. 
°- My question was there is some documents about little 
hand-held walkie-talkies, hip-held walkie-talkies. 
A
 Yes. 
°- Were those in existence as of July of '88? 
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1 Q And then when your shift came up, the end of your 
2 eight hours, actually about eight hours and 15 minutes, I guess, 
3 the other person would log in about 15 minutes before you would 
4 log out? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q And your understanding was you were paid for each and 
7 every minute you were being employed there for those eight 
8 hours? 
9 A Just the eight hours, yes, not the 15 before the 
10 eight hours. 
11 Q You were not docked for any time that you had to go 
12 to the restroom? 
13 A No. 
14 Q You were not docked for any time or deducted for any 
15 time that you spent sitting eating a sandwich or something at 
16 the post? 
17 A No. 
18 J Q Or from having a candy break or coffee or coke break? 
19 I A No. 
20 | Q Now other than the time when you were operating Car 7 
21 I or 8 — were those company cars? 
22 I A Yes. 
23 I Q Were those cars that were basically left there at the 
24 I plant? 
25 I A Yes. 
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A Who was the lieutenant on duty? 
Q Did you look to him as your supervisor? 
A Nobody ever come bothered us at Gate 4. We didn't 
see the lieutenants and stuff when we were up there. They were 
mostly down with the guys inside. 
Q Who was the lieutenant on duty that day, if you 
recall? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
I think it was Jim Hoyt, but I'm not sure. 
Jim Hoyt? 
Yes. 
Tell me, if you could, just how your day progressed 
from the time you came on the job up to the time of the 
accident, on the day of the accident. 
A Okay. It was busy, usually is at that station. 
Trucks are coming real heavy. They are backed up clear to the 
highway. About quarter after 11:00 it just — you almost — 
like there is 2 0 minutes you will get a break. I guess the 
truckers go to lunch is all we can figure. 
Q But it was pretty consistent that you would have a 
break? 
A Well, it would come at different times, but at about 
a quarter after I asked Oly, I says, Are you ready for lunch. 
And he says, No, I don't think I have or want one today. And I 
says, Okay, it looks like there is a break out there. I think I 
will go get me a cup of soup. 
17 
^^enni^fp^ Merit Reporters 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q Okay. 
A Because it's the only time you had anybody with you. 
Q All right, but at least on the day in question you 
were not — you merely went over there for yourself? 
A For myself. I had asked Oly if he wanted anything 
and he said no. He had his lunch that day. 
Q Have you talked to anyone after the accident and 
before today about this lawsuit? 
A My lawyer. 
Q Besides your lawyer? 
A No. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Those are all the questions I have. 
Thanks. 
(Whereupon the taking of this deposition was concluded.) 
* * * 
Original deposition delivered to the witness. 
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1 Q And it was all right within company policy for you to 
2 
3 A To go to the bathroom, yes. 
4 Q We have also had some testimony from Hansey and 
5 others that there was also appropriate — in addition to any 
6 time for lunch, there were also smoke breaks or coffee breaks or 
7 candy bar breaks that would be appropriate if there was some 
8 down time. 
9 A If there was down time. Gate 4 — yes. Big if. 
10 Q Now when you were in any of your capacities either at 
11 Gate 4 or at doing this Car 7 or Car 8 inside the plant, 
12 security officer duties, did you ever have an occasion to go 
13 over and pick up lunches for other employees? 
14 A Yes, I did. 
15 Q And let me make that a better question. Did you ever 
16 have occasion to go over to the Frontier Cafe and pick up 
17 lunches for employees? 
18 MR. WILLIAMS: Objection to the use of the form 
19 "employee". Vague and ambiguous as to who it refers to. 
20 Q Let's break it down. I don't want to be vague and 
21 ambiguous. I'm going to ask the question in a minute about BM 
22 and TM employees versus Burns employees. During your time at 
23 J either Gate 4 or later in Car 7 or Car 8, did you ever have 
24 | occasion to go to the Frontier Cafe to pick up lunches for any 
25 | other Burns employees? 
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A Yes. 
Q And the same question with regard to any BM and TM 
employees. 
A No. 
Q And when you picked up lunches or food from the 
Frontier Cafe, was that both in your capacity as a Gate 4 
employee as well as later on when you were in Car 7 and Car 8? 
A When I went when I was on Gate 4, it was just for me 
and the person there, or they would pick up for me when they 
went, yes. 
Q And separating Gate 4, did you also have occasion 
when you were in Car 7 and 8 to also when you went to the 
Frontier also pick up a lunch or a drink or cup of soup? 
A For any one of our employees? 
Q Other Burns employees. 
A Yes, we did. We tried to make sure we got it for 
them if they wanted something. 
Q Your understanding is that — you correct me if I'm 
wrong — is that you got there 15 minutes early so that you 
could log in before the other person logged out, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And then that same thing happened to you at the end 
of your eight hour shift? 
A And you were talking about what had happened on the 
shift before, what you needed to be aware of before they left. 
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EXHIBIT 6 
EXCERPTS OF MICHAEL TRANSTRUM'S DEPOSITION 
1 MR. WILLIAMS: Let me lodge an objection that 
2 that is a mischaracterization of the prior testimony 
3 and the record. Go ahead and answer. 
4 Q (By Mr. Harris) Is that true? 
5 A There have been management meetings, yes, at 
6 either one of those places. 
7 Q And management meetings, as I understand it, 
8 would include people from Salt Lake, Ms. Hancey, Mr. 
9 Mayne, or I guess currently Mr. Street, is it? 
10 A Yes, that is true. 
11 Q And those would be the upper management? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q And then together with yourself and the 
14 lieutenants? 
15 A And/or the lieutenants. It was not a regular 
16 I thing. 
17 j Q How often do those types of meetings take 
18 place at the cafes? 
19 j A Oh, once or twice a month, maybe. 
Q Now, are there ever occasions when these 
meetings included the security guards? 
A Not to my recollection, not when I have been 
there. 
Q Are there ever occasions when you or your 
lieutenants have meetings — I am using the term 
20 
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Q Now, are you aware that when someone is doing 
the job of rover, as to whether it was authorized or 
whether it was okay for them to stop and take a coffee 
break or a rest room break at either of those 
restaurants? 
A To my knowledge, that has never been okay 
based on my understanding of the post orders. 
Q Okay. 
A Specifically based on the January 11 Memo to 
Post. 
Q Thank you. And I will try to ask a better 
question. Prior to the January 11, 1990 Post Order, 
were you aware as to whether there was a practice of 
the rovers that they did in fact take their coffee 
break, or rest room break, or pick up a sandwich. I'm 
talking about a small break, I'm not talking about an 
hour break, or lunch hour, that type of thing, and the 
rover, not Gate 4 or Gate 1, the rover took that break 
at either of the restaurants? 
A I am aware that I think at times that that 
had happened. 
Q And that was something that the lieutenants 
were aware of, it was common knowledge? 
A I would say, yes, common knowledge. I can't 
tell you what they were aware of. I don't know what 
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A Okay. I understand what you are saying. 
Yes, I was asked, "Do people leave the Plant?" The 
answer to that is, Not to my knowledge. They 
shouldn't. The post orders I felt were very clear that 
they shouldn't. 
Q And have you since found out one way or 
another as to whether there were other instances at or 
about this time for people to go over to the cafe? 
A At about what time? 
Q July of 1988. I'm talking about the months 
and years before that, whatever had been going on 
there. 
A I have asked members of the guard force who 
were employed at that time, "Have they ever left?" and 
I received answers everywhere from, "No, that is 
against the rules and regulations," and I think 
probably at least two of them told me, "Well, I have 
done that before." 
Q On a number of occasions? 
A Their answer was, "I have done that before." 
Q And who was it that you spoke with that gave 
you those answers? 
A Oreon Olson. 
Q Oreon? 
A O-r-e-o-n. 
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1 Q Is he still employed by Burns? 
2 A Yes, he is. 
3 Q Is he a guard or a lieutenant? 
4 A He is a guard* 
5 Q And who else? 
6 A Jim Bezzant. 
7 Q And is he still employed? 
8 A Yes, he is. 
9 Q And is he a guard? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And did you talk with anyone else in the 
12 guard force? 
13 
14 | me, 
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A I talked to the lieutenants that worked for 
Q And did you ask similar questions? 
A I asked questions, yes, very similar. 
17 Q And what answer — 
A What are their understandings of it and their 
answers to me were, "We shouldn't be doing that and we 
don't do that." 
Q Now, are they referring to themselves? 
A Well, I have to say they are referring to 
themselves and the people they are responsible for. 
Q Were you given any information other than 
Gloria's time in July and Oreon Olson and Jim Bezzant, 
17 
A Mark Nielson was one of the Gate 4 people, I 
think that is what he told me, that that was a normal 
job assignment, which was Gate 4. He worked that day. 
Q Before we get to him, do you remember 
anything else that you talked about with Oreon Olson? 
A In that conversation? 
Q Yes. 
A No. I mean I talked to Oreon frequently, you 
know, but — 
Q Now, did Oreon ever indicate that he had done 
that while he was stationed alone at a gate or was it 
only done in the context of Gate 4 when there were two 
people on shift? 
A I don't think that that was discussed 
specifically, you know. My common sense would tell me 
that he couldn't do it alone because he would have to 
leave his post totally unmanned to do that. 
Q So if it did happen, you are assuming it 
happened in a situation where there were two people on 
duty and one remained on duty while the other slipped 
over and got some lunch and slipped back? 
A I would have to assume that. 
Q And I assume you get that information from 
your discussions with Oreon, and Mark, and Mr. Bezzant? 
A Those people didn't give me times and dates. 
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Q Let me ask a better question. Busier times 
than others. 
A Yes, there are busier times. 
Q And there are occasions when with two people 
there, there are holes in the action, to put it your 
way, where a break could be taken? 
A That is true. 
Q And Kim said that you don't want to take that 
during shift when there are no holes in the action, I 
think she said early in the morning when all the trucks 
get there, that it is busy. Assuming that there is a 
hole in the action and you have got two people on, 
would that be a situation where it would be permissible 
and acceptable for someone to take up to 10 or 15 
minutes or longer to eat one's lunch? 
A Yes. 
Q And they would still be paid for that? 
A Yes. 
Q They would still be logged in or on the job? 
A Yes. 
Q Correct? 
A That is true. 
Q Are you aware as to whether you have been 
involved in the discipline of anyone, and by discipline 
I mean in a broad sense, reprimand, termination, 
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go on a smoke break, or a potty break, one hundred 
yards away, doing whatever he is needing to do to 
relieve himself, that the other person is still on duty 
and that is still being manned? Correct? 
A That is true. 
Q And when that happens, when that type of 
break happens, that does not violate paragraph 7 of 
this July 1984 agreement, does it? 
A As long as they are on company property, that 
is true. 
Q What is your understanding of the policy at 
Burns on breaks? As I understand what happens, and I 
reviewed this in the last deposition, and I don't want 
to spend a lot of time doing it again. When somebody 
reports to duty, they write that they have reported for 
duty and the other person checks out and then they 
immediately check in? 
A That is true. 
Q And then they are on for eight hours? 
A That is true. 
Q And the other person reports that he checks 
in, the last person checks in, and the next person 
checks in, and it just happens three times a day? 
A Yes. 
Q And they are on for eight hours? 
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A For a normal shift. 
Q And they are paid for eight hours? 
A Yes. 
Q And basically there are three eight hour 
shifts during the day and normally that is how you do 
your crews? 
A That is true. 
Q Is there a written policy that you are aware 
of as to any kind of practice, or oral policy in effect 
with respect to the number of breaks, whether it is to 
take a smoke break, lunches, coffee breaks, rest room 
breaks? What is your understanding as to what the 
practice is? 
A Do you want me to give an explanation; this 
type of an answer to that? 
Q Yes. 
A To my knowledge there is no written 
description of what constitutes a break, or how many, 
or when. I guess you would have to say breaks are 
taken when you can get one, when you can find, you 
know, a hole in the action, let's put it that way, to 
do whatever it is you need to do, and depending on the 
job. Some jobs require that a relief be given. 
Q The rover or lieutenant, or somebody comes to 
relieve them? 
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1 each man was aware of, you would have to ask them what 
2 they were aware of. 
3 Q I will. Now, prior to January 11, 1990, 
4 either as you were in the scope of lieutenant or as the 
5 captain, had you ever disciplined any lieutenant or 
6 security guard for doing what Gloria did, or similar to 
7 what Gloria did, going across the street, getting some 
8 soup and coming back within a ten or fifteen minute 
9 break? 
10 A No, I have not. 
11 Q Are you aware as to whether anybody has ever 
12 been disciplined for that? I am talking about put on 
13 probation, given a demerit point, given a reprimand, 
u anything within the scope of how Burns disciplines 
15 their people, all the way up to termination? Are you 
16 aware of anyone that that ever happened to prior to 
17 January 11, 1990? 
18 A I am not aware of any individual, no. 
-i 9 Q Are you aware as to whether there was any 
20 action taken against Gloria for her leaving Gate 4 
21 going however many yards it was over to the Frontier 
Cafe and returning with her soup? 
A I am not aware. 
Q Did you ever have any conversation with Kim 
22 
23 
24 
25 Hancey, or Mr. Mayne, or Mr. Street as to whether there 
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EXCERPTS OF EUGENE S. BEZZANT'S DEPOSITION 
12 
Q (By Mr. Patton) If you don't know if there was one 
and Mr. Olsen says he believes there was one, you have no 
reason to consider him a liar, do you? 
A I consider him an honest man. 
Q Do you remember a memo coming down at anytime 
stating that security officers, Burns Security Officers were 
not to leave the plant to go get sandwiches or meals off of 
Geneva property? 
A I don't remember the exact time, but I do remember 
memo, yes. 
Q Did it come out after Gloria's accident? 
A As I remember it did, yes, sir. 
Q Was there any similar memo to that effect prior to 
Gloria!s accident? 
A Not to my recollection. 
Q Were security officers from gate four going up to 
the Frontier Cafe and picking up lunches real quick and 
rushing back to the gate? 
A On occasion. 
Q Were you a security guard at that time, or were you 
a lieutenant at that time? 
A No, sir, I was a security guard. 
Q Do you remember who the lieutenants were in July of 
1988? 
A No. 
16 
1 break can be in the back of the shack or somewhere else if we 
2 so desire. We donft get any time to do it/ but we have that 
3 under the law. 
4 Q Does Burns Security provide for that under their 
5 manuals, or do you just have that under the law? 
6 A It's under the law. 
7 Q So Burns Security doesn't really provide for that, 
8 do they, in their manuals? 
9 A Sir, I don't know. I don't know that in detail. 
10 Q Have you ever known anybody to be reprimanded for 
11 eating lunch at the guard house there at gate four? 
12 A No, sir. 
13 Q Have you ever known anyone to be reprimanded for 
14 going up to Frontier Cafe and picking up a sandwich and eating 
15 it there at the guard shack? 
16 A Not to my knowledge. 
17 Q Do you know whether individuals were doing that in 
18 1988? 
19 A On occasion. 
20 Q Do you know the names of any of the individuals 
21 besides Gloria Swenson who were doing that? 
22 A I guess I could say I was on occasion. 
23 Q Did anyone ever tell you you were not supposed to do 
24 that? I mean after, obviously the memo came out later, but 
25 prior to Gloria's accident did anyone ever tell you you 
10 
1 A I would say four or 500 yards. I mean going by a 
2 block I'd say a block at least, a city block• 
3 Q Is the Frontier Cafe a city block away from gate 
4 four? 
5 A Yes# sir. 
6 Q Is it more than a city block? 
7 A No, sir. 
8 Q So it's about the same as a city block? 
9 A That's correct, sir. 
10 Q It's about the same distance as going to lower gate 
11 four? 
12 A That's right. 
13 Q Did you have occasion to work gate four regularly 
14 during the summer months of 1988? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Did you know Gloria Swenson at that time? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q Did you consider her to be a good employee? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Did you consider her to be a good guard? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Do you have occasion to work in that little building 
23 next to gate four? 
24 A I don't understand the question, sir. 
25 Q Well/ you said there was like a five by five little 
18 
1 Q What if you were an EMT, not just a security guard 
2 but an EMT, would it be expected an EMT would assist in that 
3 situation if someone were hurt? 
4 A I don't know* 
5 Q Is it possible that an EMT might consider it to be 
6 their responsibility to assist? 
7 MR. WILLIAMS: Object to the form of the question, 
8 calls for speculation, and it's vague and ambiguous in use of 
9 possible. 
10 Q (By Mr. Patton) Is it possible that an EMT security 
11 guard might consider that to be the responsibility? 
12 MR. WILLIAMS: Same objection. 
13 THE WITNESS: I don't know, sir. 
14 Q (By Mr. Patton) Do you know if any of the 
15 lieutenants or supervisors at Burns Security during the summer 
16 of 1988 knew that you or Gloria or any other security officers 
17 were going up to the Frontier Cafe and picking up a sandwich 
18 and coming back and eating it? 
19 A Yes, I would think so. 
20 Q Why would you think that? 
21 A Because occasionally they would come to the gate at 
22 the time we were at the place picking up a lunch or whatever 
23 we were picking up. 
24 Q And that's because the lieutenants sort of roam 
25 around the plant; isn't that true? 
